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Justice Scalia: Supreme Court 
Legend & Anomaly
By: Trevor Diggan
Antonin Scalia was born on March 11th, 
1936 in Trenton, New Jersey. Both of his parents 
were of Italian descent and educators, which had a 
significant impact on Antonin’s development as a 
child. At an early age, his family moved to Queens, 
New York where he excelled in academics and 
graduated as Valedictorian at St. Francis Xavier 
High School in Manhattan. His intellect at such a 
young age did not go unnoticed, as he was accepted 
into Georgetown University in 1953 and graduated 
with a bachelor’s degree in history at the top of his 
undergraduate class. He continued his education at 
Harvard Law School becoming the notes editor for 
the Harvard Law review, and again graduated as the 
Valedictorian for a third consecutive time in 1960. 
In 1961, he practiced at a private firm called Jones 
Day that focused on international law. “While he 
excelled as a commercial law attorney for the next 
six years, he recognized that he held a greater 
appreciation for the academic aspects of law rather 
than the practical ones” (Oyez).  Scalia’s upbringing 
of academics shifted his priorities into later 
becoming a professor of administrative law at the 
University of Virginia in 1967. He believed that 
studying, teaching, and internalizing law was a 
route to better understanding the legal structure of 
the United States. His administrative scholarship 
would later pay off when Richard Nixon appointed 
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him in 1971 to be the general counsel for the Office 
of Telecommunications, where he would suggest 
federal policies on television. Eventually, in 1972 
until 1974, he would become the chair of the 
Administrative Conference of the United States, 
where his duty was to maximize the efficiency and 
effectiveness of federal bureaucracies. President 
Ford nominated Scalia for Assistant Attorney 
General of the Office of Legal Counsel in 1974 
after Nixon’s resignation. The conflict that occurred 
after the Watergate scandal made Scalia resign and 
go back to teaching at the Chicago School of Law 
until 1982 when President Reagan nominated him 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit. In his four years of 
being on this court, he proved to be extraordinarily 
intelligible and a veteran at legal writing. In 1986 
Reagan nominated him for the Supreme Court to fill 
the vacancy of Justice Rehnquist, who became 
Chief Justice when Chief Justice Warren Burger 
retired. Scalia was viewed as one of the most 
qualified people to be nominated to the Supreme 
Court with his rich background in academia and his 
wide range of legal experience. Scalia’s hearing was 
purely traditional, and he was voted in 98-0 by the 
Senate. 
Scalia’s previous legal work in 
administrations that were led by conservatives 
would later shape his attitudes in deciding his cases, 
and his decision-making process would fit partially 
inside the attitudinal model because of his 
experiences. However, it is essential not to forget 
Scalia’s strict constructionist/originalist view of the 
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constitution, which meant he would interpret the 
words of the document in the context of when it was 
first written. The intention in which the law was 
created was how he shaped his opinions, and he 
strongly opposed the idea of the constitution being a 
living document that adopts to the intentions of 
modern society. "If you're going to be a good and 
faithful judge, you have to resign yourself to the 
fact that you're not always going to like the 
conclusions you reach. If you like them all the time, 
you're probably doing something wrong.” (Speech 
at Chapman Law School, 2005). His respect for the 
law left out the strategic model in his decision-
making process because he did not make decisions 
based on policy implications. He did not always like 
the conclusions he met. Additionally, Scalia was not 
afraid to argue and would shy away from 
cooperation with other justices if it meant straying 
away from what the law intends. He was known for 
writing strong dissenting opinions that were 
extremely difficult to argue against, and that would 
unintentionally make the majority opinion stronger 
because justices would work harder to counter his 
arguments. 
On his first day on the bench, Scalia 
consistently and continuously asked questions that 
would later influence the outcome of the majority 
decision. “Before he joined, court was in a sleepy 
state” (Mortensen 2017). Scalia influenced the 
Court to start asking more questions and changed 
the culture of the court. He enjoyed arguing and was 
ready to be challenged, never taking debate 
personally. “Even though he was aggressive he was 
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very straight forward, he only wanted to challenge 
you on the fundamentals of the case” (Mortensen 
2017). When there wasn’t something in the 
constitution or statutes that had to do with the case 
at hand, he believed it was the will of the people to 
decide and that he was only there to interpret law, 
not create it. Meg Scalia in Scalia: The Portrait of a 
Man and Jurist states that her father believed that 
the Supreme Court should not be making policy 
decisions and she referred to him as saying “you 
really want a bunch of old white people who are out 
of tune with society to be making this decision” 
about newer social issues. Clearance Thomas also 
stated in Scalia: The Portrait of a Man and Jurist
that he properly protected the constitution and the 
values inside it that protect the people’s rights and 
the separation of power. He was commonly called 
an originalist and stuck to the initial language of the 
constitution. He was dumbfounded by the idea of 
allowing interpretation based on the evolving 
understanding of intentions and believed that doing 
this would enable loose and ambiguous 
interpretation. He thought many who did not 
interpret the original literal meaning of statutes 
carried an embarrassing argument that destroyed the 
purpose of a statute. Scalia was high on the 
extraversion scale because he had a large preference 
for influence and attention. He loved being a large 
influence on decisions and consistently brought 
attention his way by arguing and asking questions 
all the time. Before being on the Supreme Court, he 
was in fields of work where he would have direct 
administrative influence over people and taught law 
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where students would be attentive to him. He was 
assertive in his opinions and desired to be in 
leadership roles. He sought to achieve his legal 
goals by stunting the opposition’s opinion and 
would influence how they would structure their 
opinions. Along with this, Scalia was a sociable 
justice who initiated interaction, whether it be 
discussing with the other justices or interrupting the 
Court hearing to ask questions. He was a justice 
who desired to interact in contrast to justices like 
Clarence Thomas. 
Scalia believed that the only viable way to 
create law is by constricting interpreters from using 
their personal beliefs in making decisions. The 
constitution is full of broad language that can be 
interpreted in a wide range of ways. Still, Scalia 
argued that this vague language had a specific 
intention that should be recognized. In this way, he 
was considered a conservative judge because he 
happened to make decisions that preserve and 
protect the original meanings. “The worst thing 
about the living constitution is that it will destroy 
the constitution” (Mortensen 2017). He would use 
dictionaries from the year a statute was made to 
interpret what the words meant at the time rather 
than using the modern meaning. He was incredibly 
particular when it came to his work that he would 
be upset when somebody said, “cite to a case” 
instead of “cite a case.” “Words mattered, ideas, 
principles, and structure mattered to him a lot” 
(Clarence Thomas). When other justices insisted to 
Scalia that times were changing, and words were 
evolving, he persisted that it should not be up to the 
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Court to decide these changes. Instead he believed 
that lawmakers should be the ones to change a law, 
not the Supreme Court, through manipulating the 
language of law subtly to create a new law or 
meaning. Gay marriage was a great example of this, 
and he believed that the states should be the ones to 
create a law that allows same-sex marriage. He did 
not believe that the Supreme Court should decide 
that people have the right to same-sex marriage 
because it would create precedent that would allow 
it nationally. He questioned during Obergefell et al. 
v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et 
al. (2005) when it became unconstitutional to 
restrict gay people to marriage; this is a problem for 
the legislature. He stated that if a bill went to 
Congress that would allow same-sex marriage 
nationally, he would support it, but it is not an issue 
of the Court to create policy. This is an example 
should when he holds regard to the constitution and 
what it does or does not prohibit over his personal 
positions. 
Scalia, as a writer, was able to communicate 
ideas that liberals and conservatives both look to for 
a better understanding of the law and pure 
entertainment. He enjoyed writing opinions, and 
many found his practice of law straightforward to 
the point where he could tell you what the main 
issue is of the Court. Many people think he did not 
care about having allies, and he was sarcastic in his 
writing. He had an impressive logic and was clear in 
his arguments; those who disagreed with him 
learned they had to focus intensely on the structure 
of their language.  Scalia had a sense of dutifulness, 
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and he always felt obligated to state his opinion and 
write one when necessary. He felt compelled to 
comply with the intent of an Amendment or a 
statute and respected the purpose of laws. When it 
came to conventional rules and norms, however, he 
sought to change what everybody was used to. 
Consistently asking questions was one of those 
norms he brought onto the laps of others, except for 
Justice Thomas who did not ask a question until his 
tenth year on the bench. 
Scalia was known as the Great Dissenter of 
the Court; nobody wrote as unique dissenting 
opinions as he did. He was not bitter but zealous 
about finding inconsistencies in the majority's 
opinions. “He referred to my opinion as a liberty 
destroying cocktail” (Clarence Thomas). Justices 
who worked with him agree that his opinions were 
always powerful and that when they wrote opinions, 
they had to predict what he was going to argue to 
keep up with him. They also agree that his use of 
language is what made him a better opinion writer 
than all of them. Scalia was not an agreeable justice 
inside the Court; he did not prefer social harmony 
when the Court would make decisions. Scalia’s 
sarcastic tendencies made him seem impolite at 
most times, but he was just eager to extract more 
information. He continuously interrupted, asking 
questions and demanding explanations during all 
Court hearings. He was not afraid to argue and write 
the dissenting opinion when necessary and is in 
second place for dissenting opinions with 256 total. 
Other than being abrasive in his work, 
outside the job, he left everything behind the doors 
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in the courthouse. Many of his colleagues found 
him to be hilarious and outgoing outside the Court. 
Justice Ginsberg said he was entertaining outside 
out the Court and would love to go to the Opera 
with her. He was infatuated with art, Italian opera, 
and music. His relationship with other justices 
shows that outside his work, he is a more agreeable 
person who values social harmony and can hold a 
genuine friendship with his colleagues who oppose 
him in most cases. 
Justice Scalia may have been known for his 
excellent explanatory power in his words, but it is 
also important to recognize the historical impact 
some of his opinions will leave behind. In 
Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio 
Department of Health, et al. (2005), Michigan, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio all legally define 
marriage as the union between a man and a woman. 
The petitioners included fourteen same-sex couples 
and two men whose partners were deceased. The 
petitioners claimed that the states were violating 
their Fourteenth Amendment right because they 
legally could not marry or have a lawful ceremony 
that is given full recognition by the state. Each 
district court ruled in their favor, but when the Sixth 
Circuit Court became involved, they reversed the 
decision. The Supreme Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires states to license 
marriages between people of the same sex and to 
recognize marriages that were licensed out of state. 
Scalia was the dissenting opinion and, of course, 
many believe it was because of his conservative 
views, but this was not his reasoning. Scalia argued 
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that if a bill were created in Congress to make 
same-sex marriage legal nationally, he would 
support it. He believed that this ruling, in fact, was a 
threat to democracy because of how it was decided.
“It is not of special importance to 
me what the law says about 
marriage. It is of overwhelming 
importance, however, who it is 
that rules me. Today's decree says 
that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 
320 million Americans coast-to-
coast, is a majority of the nine 
lawyers on the Supreme Court. 
The opinion in these cases is the 
furthest extension in fact--and the 
furthest extension one can even 
imagine--of the Court's claimed 
power to create "liberties" that the 
Constitution and its Amendments 
neglect to mention. This practice 
of constitutional revision by an 
unelected committee of nine, 
always accompanied (as it is 
today) by extravagant praise of 
liberty, robs the People of the 
most important liberty they 
asserted in the Declaration of 
Independence and won in the 
Revolution of 1776: the freedom 




He argued that the Court was making a 
decision that should be up to the states. The 
regulation of domestic states is a power that is 
granted to the states and has been historically 
regarded as an exclusive right states have. 
Additionally, he argued that when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified in 1868, every state 
limited marriage to a man and a woman. The 
context in which the Fourteenth Amendment was 
written it was not considered unconstitutional for a 
state to prohibit same-sex marriage. Here we can 
see Scalia’s originalist view really comes out; it is 
fair to say this is a conservative way of making 
decisions, but he does not make the decision 
because he is against same-sex marriage. Instead, 
Scalia cared that the Fourteenth Amendment is 
taken in the context in which it was first written, 
which was in a time where same-sex marriage was 
not legalized in any states and prohibiting it would 
not have been considered unconstitutional. Scalia 
also contended that the judicial branch is the least 
dangerous branch that is constricted of power of 
execution and independent from the will of the 
public. In this case, he used the purpose and 
foundation of the Court to show that Court was 
driven by impact of what the public will think of the 
Court. This rhetoric is to display his concern about 
the intentions of the Court’s decision. Scalia’s 
rhetoric, in this case, is displayed by his nature 
toward legal literalism and to criticize his 
colleagues. 
In Murray v. United States (1998) the 
petitioner Murray was a suspect of illegal drug 
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activity; as the petitioner and some others left their 
warehouse, federal agents became increasingly 
suspicious when they noticed a tractor-trailer with a 
container on the back of it. The petitioners gave 
their tractor-trailers to other drivers that were 
intercepted by agents and arrested. When they were 
arrested, the containers were confiscated, and the 
agents found marijuana. When the agents applied 
for the warrant, they did not bring up the previous 
entry or their observations inside the warehouse. 
When the warrant was issued, the agents went back 
into the warehouse and found more bales of 
marijuana (270) and other incriminating evidence. 
When the petitioners went to the district court, their 
pretrial motion to have these findings suppressed 
was denied. They argued that the agents’ warrant 
was void because of their prior warrantless entry. 
The Court of Appeals decided that it was unlawful 
to suppress the questioning of whether the first 
entry was violating the Fourth Amendment or not. 
The Supreme Court found that the Fourth 
Amendment does not mandate that evidence 
discovered initially to be suppressed during the 
agent's illegal entry. That is only if the evidence is 
additionally discovered during a search that is later 
conducted with a warrant that is completely 
independent of the initial illegal entry by the agents. 
Scalia delivered the opinion in this case 
emphasizing that the obtained information was not 
connected with the original entry of the warehouse. 
He argued that the product of the main evidence 
was obtained by the incidental outcome of the 
unlawful search conducted by the agents, so the 
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evidence is not tainted. Scalia continued to refer to 
society's interest when he quoted Nix v. Williams, 
467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984), and stated that society 
wishes to deter unlawful police activity. He further 
stated from this quote that receiving evidence in a 
situation where there was no police error would not 
have made a difference compared to a case where 
evidence was retrieved independently after an 
illegal violation of privacy (police error). Scalia 
here used public consensus strategically, knowing 
that most people regarded him as an originalist 
interpreter of law. He displayed the social relevance 
of how people care about their right to the Fourth 
Amendment while stopping criminal activity from 
thorough assumptions. Using this social background 
can legitimatize the agent’s actions while 
convincing the Court that it isn’t hurting the Fourth 
Amendment because the warranted search was 
independent from the first search. Continuing 
further through Scalia’s argument, he stated that the 
government’s view on this issue has received a 
better basis in precedent and policy. The 
government finds that the independent lawful search 
can indeed be separated by the findings of the 
original illegally conducted search. This line of 
thinking showed that Scalia believed that policy 
normalization helps provide a foundation of 
legitimacy. The government's favorability in 
precedent is an important factor to Scalia that 
showed his positive attitude towards 
institutionalized set law. Scalia tended to find 
comfort in consistency in law where ideas are built 
in a foundation or “set in stone”.
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In District of Columbia et al. v. Heller 
(2008), the District of Columbia created laws that 
made it illegal to carry an unregistered firearm, 
prohibited people from registering handguns, and 
made lawful owners unload and dissemble or 
trigger-lock their weapon within their residency. 
The respondent Heller, who was a policeman, 
applied to register a handgun to keep in his home, 
but the District of Columbia restricted him from 
doing so. In return, Heller filed a lawsuit on the 
District of Columbia claiming that the law 
restricting handguns was prohibiting his use of 
functional firearms in his home. The District Court 
dismissed his lawsuit, but the D.C. Circuit 
recognized the relevance of his suit and reversed the 
dismissal. The D.C. Circuit held that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to own 
firearms and that the restriction on handguns, as 
well as the mandate that required all firearms in a 
residence to be kept non-functional even in a state 
where they would be used for self-defense, violated 
the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court then 
held that that the Second Amendment defends one’s 
right to own a firearm that is not related to service 
in a militia and that it is not unlawful to have a 
handgun for self-defense in one’s own 
home/residency. The Court additionally held that a 
total ban on handgun possession in one’s residency 
is a ban on a whole class of arms in a place where it 
is important to defend yourself or your property 
would be a constitutional failure. The Court referred 
to United States v. Miller where the purpose of the 
Second Amendment is not limited only for militia 
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reasons but instead limits the class of weapon that 
can be used by those in a militia for lawful 
purposes. 
Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court 
first arguing that forcing those who lawfully own
firearms to have them unloaded and dissembled or 
requiring a trigger lock defeats the purpose of 
having them available for self-defense and other 
lawful reasons. Scalia argues that when interpreting 
the Second Amendment, “we are guided by the 
principle that the constitution was written to be 
understood by the voters; its words and phrases 
were used in their normal and ordinary as 
distinguished by technical meaning.” Assuming that 
there were no indirect meanings or exceptions in 
unusual circumstances shows Scalia’s focus on the 
purpose of the constitution. He is consistent with 
the fact that specific parts of the constitution 
(mostly Bill of Rights) were made to be easily 
understood and are not due to new interpretation.
Along with this, his decision follows on the 
implications of the policy but does not make the 
decision primarily to change the policy. He 
understands that the ability to have arms readily 
available for defense or lawful reasons is stricken 
away by these new laws and that citizens will have 
trouble using their weapons in a time of emergency 
or when it is necessary. It is fair to say that there 
was some political focus on the freedom to bear 
arms and that his decision making here fits the 
attitudinal model. His decision was also made with 
respect to the foundation of the law of the land 
fitting the legal model; he consistently referred to 
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precedent that neatly fitted in this case (e.g. 
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)). His decision-making 
process also focused on definitional meaning in the 
era of when the Second Amendment was 
established. This ties in with his originalist/literalist 
way of interpreting the law. Turning to the phrases 
“keep arms” and “bear arms”, he found the 
definition referred to these as “to retain; not to lose” 
and “to have in custody” in Johnson 1095. He 
continues to use Webster’s definition to support his 
argument; “to retain in one’s power or possession.” 
Scalia’s specific language, in this case, is a 
pattern that can be seen in many other cases such as 
Murray v. United States (1998) when he described 
the findings by their warranted entrance by the 
agents “independent” from their initial illegal entry. 
The language used in this previously discussed case 
is much like this one, where he uses the terms 
“keep, bear, retain, and custody” to describe what 
gun ownership entails. His scope on the original 
definition at the time a law was made displays his 
desire for exact meanings.
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut 
(1986), a Connecticut statute (9-431), was enacted 
in 1955 that made voters in any political primary to 
be registered members of that party. In 1984, the 
Republican Party of Connecticut adopted a rule that 
allows independent voters, who are register voters 
not affiliated with a particular party, to vote in 
Republican primaries (Federal and State). The party 
appellees stated in Federal District Court that 
section 9-431 deprives the Party of its First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Entering “political 
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association with individuals of its own choosing and 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief” 
(Republican Party of Connecticut 1986), were the 
rights they believed were being stripped away from 
citizens. The District Court decided in a summary 
judgement to rule in the appellees’ favor, and the 
Court of Appeals confirmed this judgement. The 
Supreme Court held that this statute impermissibly 
burdens the rights of the Party and its members 
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendment. 
Section 9-431 puts limits on the group of registered 
voters to participate in choosing their Party’s 
candidates. The state’s power in elections was 
found not to be justified in the act of curtailing basic 
rights like voting or the freedom of political 
association. 
Scalia wrote the dissenting opinion stating 
that the right to the freedom of association and the 
State’s power to create arrangements that satisfy 
fair and effective party involvement in the election 
process is vital to a democratic government. 
However, he believes that the Court’s opinion 
overstates the significance of the associational 
interest that is being disputed. He continues that 
“the Connecticut voter who, while steadfastly 
refusing to register as a Republican, casts a vote in 
the Republican primary, forms no more meaningful 
an “association” with the Party than does the 
independent or the registered Democrat who 
respond to questions by a Republican Party 
pollster” (Scalia 1986). He argues that the basis of 
the initial intrusion of voters’ rights must be viewed 
as whether there is or is not a true limitation being 
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put on the voters. Scalia says the Court’s opinion 
has two main flaws in their decision “to protect the 
integrity of the Party against the Party itself.” The 
first flaw he describes as the Court having no way 
of knowing that most of the members in the Party 
are in favor of allowing the ultimate selection of its 
candidates for federal and statewide office to be 
decided by people outside of the Party. The second 
flaw he says even if most of the Party’s members 
desired its candidates to be decided by outsiders, 
there is no reason the State is legally obligated to 
respect that desire any more than it would be 
obligated to respect a Party’s democratically 
conveyed desire that its candidates be selected by a 
convention instead of a primary. Scalia, who is a 
more conservative justice, does not budge at all for 
the Republican party and seems to disregard 
politics. Many would argue that he decided this way 
primarily to avoid criticism for arguing in favor of 
the Republican party, but instead, he looked into the 
case as a way to argue the limitations in violations 
of associational rights. 
Comparing his decision making in this case 
to Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio 
Department of Health, et al. (2005) he is consistent 
on not making decisions in his personal preferences. 
Even if he tends to be in agreeance with the 
Republican Party or same-sex marriage (as 
legislation), he holds a strong loyalty to law and 
what it means even if he does not like it. He 
continues to act selflessly in making his own 
decisions and wishes for the law of the land to 
prosper rather than his own desires. He argues in 
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both cases that the Court is not legally held to 
protect or pass rules that they are not authorized to, 
and the state can make their own election laws that 
may be a burden, but not a threat to the voters’ 
rights. This is much like when he insisted that the 
legislative branch should have discretion in 
deciding whether same-sex marriage should be 
legalized. In the process of writing the dissenting 
opinion, he allocates his focus to finding flaws in 
the majority’s decision. Scalia depends on strictly 
logic, fact, and the specifics in finding problems in 
arguments. Looking at the logic of voter preferences 
and rights, he criticizes the legal obligations of 
states in specific situations that relate to the current 
one. His theoretical questioning displays his ability 
to undermine the Court’s opinion, and he explains 
how situations that are not entirely different from
the case in front of him harm the majority’s opinion 
and its credibility. 
In Immigration and Naturalization Service 
v. Cardoza-Fonseca (1987), the Supreme Court 
debates whether Section 243(h) in the Immigration 
and Nationality Act requires the Attorney General 
to withhold deporting an alien who shows that their 
life or freedom would be in danger if they remained 
in their country. This section makes it so that an 
alien must show that it is more likely than not that 
they would be subject to persecution. 208(a), 
however, gives the Attorney General the discretion 
to give asylum to a refugee who is unable or no 
longer willing to go back to their home country 
because of a well-founded fear. At the illegal alien’s 
deportation hearing, the judge used the 243(h) 
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“more likely than not” evidence-standard to their 
208(a) asylum claim, holding that they did not 
establish a clear probability of persecution. The 
Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed this 
decision, but the Court of Appeals reversed, stating 
that the “well-founded fear” standard is more 
indulgent than section 243(h) in that it only makes 
asylum seekers show past persecution or “good 
reason” to fear possible persecution. The Supreme 
Court held that section 243(h) “clear probability” 
standard of proof does not govern asylum 
applications in section 208(a). The Court found that 
section 243(h)’s “would be threatened” principle 
has no subjective part but requires objective proof 
that it is more likely that the illegal alien will 
experience persecution when they deported.
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgement of 
the Supreme Court, stating that he believes that the 
meaning of “well-founded fear” and “clear 
probability” are not of the same standard. He 
believes that the Court had an extensive 
investigation of how this law was made in 
legislative process and that this investigation shows 
that the intent was clearly expressed, and the 
language of the statute is in no way misleading. 
Scalia contends that the Court’s discussion is to 
express controversy and interpret their decision in a 
previous case. Scalia uses precedent and argues that 
“the Court first implies that the Court's discussion is 
flatly inconsistent with this well-established 
interpretation. The Court first implies that Courts 
may substitute their interpretation of a statute for 
that of an agency whenever. Employing traditional 
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tools of statutory construction, they are able to 
reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of 
the statute” (Scalia 1987). Scalia continues to say 
that he does not understand why the Court is 
zealous to rebuild the standard procedure of 
administrative law. Here Scalia clearly argues 
purposivism in interpreting the statute expressing 
his concern for how the language of the statute was 
carried out. He believes that the language was 
straightforward, instead of being misleading. In this 
argument, he distinguishes the differences of 
meanings: “well-founded fear” and “clear 
probability.” Scalia displays his more meticulous 
side of interpretation by showing the difference in 
time of these two phrases. Scalia explains that a 
“well-founded fear” means that there has been a 
present danger in the past that causes one to leave 
their country, but a “clear probability” means that 
there is a present likelihood that if one goes back to 
their country, they will be persecuted. Separating 
these terms is important to him because one tells us 
whether a person can go back to their home country 
now without being harmed, while the other talks 
about the foundation of fear that made them leave 
their home country. Here we can see Scalia’s regard 
for the original meaning, and that believes that 
ambiguity is left out of the statute compared to 
previous similar cases. Here he not only holds 
importance to the definition of a statute but the way 
it is legally exerted on those seeking asylum. 
Scalia is an interesting party in deciding this 
case because he is a child of an immigrant while 
being considered a conservative justice. Scalia may 
11th Edition
74
have a bias that is not completely obvious, but his 
favorability for legal immigration is present in this 
case. Even if there is a clear probability of proof of 
persecution, asylum is not always guaranteed. His 
administrative bias is minimally clear in the fact 
that he agrees with stricter conditions for allowing 
asylum while prioritizing the intent of the statute. 
Scalia displays his minor complexity in deciphering 
the meaning of legislation from his pre-dispositions 
on immigration and administrative decisions 
regarding immigration. 
On February 13th, 2016, Scalia passed away 
from natural causes leaving behind a legacy as a 
jurist, scholar, dissenter, and a father of nine. Scalia 
will be remembered in history books for his 
remarkable influence on the Supreme Court’s 
workings, as well as the controversial cases he took. 
After reading many of his cases and the entirety of 
his life, Justice Scalia has become my favorite 
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